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Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid-
Part I: Impact and Analysis
Zhenghao Zhang, Shuping Gong, Aleksandar D. Dimitrovski, and Husheng Li,
Abstract—Many operations in power grids, such as fault
detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing
information. In this paper, a novel Time Synchronization Attack
(TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart
grid. Since many applications in smart grid utilize synchronous
measurements and most of the measurement devices are equipped
with global positioning system (GPS) for precise timing, it is
highly probable to attack the measurement system by spoofing
the GPS. The effectiveness of TSA is demonstrated for three
applications of phasor measurement unit (PMU) in smart grid,
namely transmission line fault detection, voltage stability moni-
toring and event locationing. The validity of TSA is demonstrated
by numerical simulations.
Index Terms—Time Synchronization Attack, Synchronized
Monitoring, GPS spoofing, Smart Grid
I. INTRODUCTION
The research interest in smart grid [10] has been growing
in recent years. As one of the key components in smart grid,
wide area monitoring systems (WAMSs) [25] have received
tremendous attention. The reliability of the smart grid system
relies on the operation of WAMSs, since the operations of
smart grid demand the real-time status of system provided by
WAMSs.
WAMSs are typically constructed in a centralized manner.
The monitoring devices are placed throughout the entire smart
grid system, and they convey their measurement data to the
control center by certain communication infrastructure, such
as wireless network and optical fiber network. The control
center implements the analysis on these measurement data,
and corresponding control decisions will be made to maintain
the normal operation of smart grid. Note that supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [15] have been
applied for maintaining the reliability of the power grid control
systems. However, SCADA mostly deals with random failures
in the system, instead of malicious attacks.
The security of WAMSs is one of the key issues in smart
grid technology, since errors of monitoring measurements
introduced by malicious attackers will cause wrong control
decisions, which may lead to a catastrophe like blackout
[23]. [2] proposed a security strategy against denial-of-service
(DoS) attack which focuses on the cyber security of the
communication infrastrcuture. Meanwhile, malicious attack
against measurement data, namely false data injection attack
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Fig. 1: Illustration of time synchronized monitoring in smart
grid with GPS spoofer
(FDIA) has been studied in [12] [17] [16]. By launching
FDIA, malicious attackers can manipulate the system state
variables by modifying the measurements at a set of selected
monitoring devices. FDIA can mislead the control center to
have an incorrect evaluation on the system operation status;
consequently wrong control decisions will be made.
To launch FDIA successfully, malicious attackers need to
have full knowledge of the power gird network such that a
systematic false measurements can be generated to bypass the
bad measurement detection [13]. However, it is very difficult
for attackers to obtain the full knowledge of the power grid
network infrastructure which can only be accessed by the
power system operator. In addition, FDIA requires physical
accesses to several selected monitoring devices in order to
inject the false measurement data. This is another difficulty in
practice, since those monitoring devices are typically placed
at locations with physical security protection.
In this paper, we identify a potential attack to WAMSs in
smart Grid, coined time synchronization attack (TSA). Note
that monitoring devices are distributed throughout the entire
power grid network, whose measurements data are fed back
to the control center with various transmission delays. To
obtain an accurate system operation status, the control center
needs to align all collected measurements in the time domain,
which is called time synchronized monitoring [6]. Since global
positioning system (GPS) signal is highly accurate and stable
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for timing without any extra communication infrastructure,
GPS based time synchronization monitoring devices have been
vastly deployed in smart grid monitoring system. Figure 1
illustrates time synchronized monitoring in smart grid. There
are n time synchronized measuring devices (TSMD) installed
throughout the entire smart grid system, and each of them is
equipped with a GPS signal receiver. Note that TSMD is a
general conception, which could be any measurement devices
requiring time synchronization, e.g. phase measurement units
(PMU). The grid operation state parameters, such as frequency
and voltage, are sampled periodically and the sampling is
triggered by the GPS timing signal from the GPS receiver. To
cope with the different data transmission delays of different
measurements, it is necessary to attach the time values at
which the measurements are sampled. This procedure is simi-
lar to posting a stamp to the measurements (hence called time
stamp). The control center aligns the collected measurements
according to their time stamps, and analyzes the system state
for future control actions.
By applying GPS timing as the grid-wide sampling ref-
erence time, all TSMDs in the smart grid sample the ob-
servations in a synchronous manner. However, a malicious
attacker can modify the sampling time by introducing a forged
GPS signal [9]. There are several studies that have identi-
fied the possibility of spoofing GPS receivers [9] [19] [22].
Furthermore, a realworld GPS spoofing attack was reported
recently [7], which demonstrated the vulnerability of GPS
signals. Note that the malicious attacker does not need to
hack into the monitoring system or have physical contact to
the TSMDs. In addition, it is difficult to locate the malicious
attacker since it can transmit the GPS spoofing signal as it
moves around the target TSMD. As illustrated in Figure 1,
the malicious attacker launches a TSA to one of the TSMDs
by transmitting counterfeit GPS signal, in which the timing
has been modified. The target TSMD will do sampling at a
wrong time. Consequently, the measurements with false time
stamps are conveyed to the control center. The control center
will therefore misalign the measurements and will obtain an
incorrect system state. Although there is some data processing
procedure to handle the measurements, most current process-
ing schemes only consider the measurement error caused by
noise or packet loss; therefore, TSA can easily bypass a simple
countermeasure scheme such as smoothing filtering.
Motivated by the security requirement of smart grid, in this
paper, the impacts of TSA will be identified and the severeness
of TSA will also be analyzed. Specifically, we study TSA
in three applications of PMU, namely transmission line fault
detection/locationing, voltage stability monitoring and event
locationing. Moreover, TSA is not constrained to only PMU
applications. There exist potential TSA opportunities in any
monitoring system requiring time synchronization. Simulation
results will demonstrate that TSA can effectively deteriorate
the performance of these applications and may even result in
false operations in power system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the GPS spoofing attack model. Section III studies
the impacts of TSA on transmission line fault detection and
fault localization. The TSA damage analysis and correspond-
ing simulation result of the voltage monitoring algorithm are
presented in Section IV. And Section V presents the study
of TSA in the task of regional perturbation event location.
Conclusions and future work are provided in Section VI.
II. GPS SIGNAL RECEIVING AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we briefly introduce the GPS signal recep-
tion processing. Then we propose the attack model for GPS
spoofing and TSA.
Fig. 2: Subframe-1 structure
A. Introduction of GPS Signal Receiving
The precise timing information from GPS signals includes
two parts: one is embedded in the navigation messages de-
modulated from the received GPS signals, whose precision
is in the order of seconds; the other part is the precise
signal propagation time from the GPS satellite to the receiver,
which has the precision of millisecond for civilian users. The
timing information with precision of second is located in
subframe 1, whose frame structure [4] is illustrated in Figure
2, where “TLM” is the telemetry data severing as preamble,
and “HOW” provides the GPS time-of-week (TOW) modulo
6 seconds corresponding to the leading edge of the following
subframe. Therefore, with TOW and GPS week number, we
can obtain the date and the time with the precision of second.
To obtain a more precise time value, we need to calculate
the propagation time of the GPS signal from the satellite to
the GPS receiver. Therefore, users in different locations can
be synchronized by exploiting the GPS precise timing infor-
mation as a time reference. The system-wide synchronization
time reference is referred to the coordinated universal time
(UTC) tUTC disseminated by GPS, which is given by
tUTC = trcv − tp −∆tUTC . (1)
where trcv and tp denote the receiver clock time and propaga-
tion time for the GPS signal, respectively; and ∆tUTC denotes
the time corrections provided by the GPS ground controllers.
To obtain the navigation message, we need to demodulate
the GPS signal. A typical GPS signal reception processing
is illustrated in Figure 3.
The received standard positioning service (SPS) GPS signal
r(t) is given by
r(t) =
32∑
k=1
Hk(2Pc)
1
2 (Ck(t)⊕Dk(t))cos2π(fL1+∆fk)t+n(t),
(2)
where Hk and Pc are the channel matrix for the k-th satellite
and the signal power, respectively; Ck(t) and Dk(t) are the
spread spectrum sequence (C/A code) and the navigation
message data from the k-th satellite, respectively; fL1 and ∆fk
are the carrier frequency for civilian GPS signal and doppler
frequency shift for the k-th satellite, respectively; and n(t) is
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Fig. 3: Diagram of GPS signal receiving processing
(a) No attack (b) Under spoofing attck
Fig. 4: Comparison of the correlation peak under normal and
spoofing attack reception conditions.
noise. As illustrated in Figure 3, the signal processing includes
two major steps, namely acquisition and tracking. From (2),
we can observe that the key processing for acquisition is
to search for the code phase of the received C/A code and
doppler frequency shift δfk. By multiplying the C/A code
of identical code phase and the carrier of identical frequency
with the received GPS signal, the navigation message can be
demodulated coherently [4].
B. Attack model
To spoof a GPS receiver, the GPS receiver needs to be
misled to acquire the fake GPS signal instead of the true one.
Since the acquisition is implemented by searching for the high-
est correlation peak in the code-phase-carrier-frequency two
dimensional space, intuitively, the signal with higher signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) will have a higher correlation peak, which
is illustrated in Figure 4. Therefore, there exists a two-step
spoofing strategy. In the first step, the spoofer launches certain
interference which causes the GPS receiver to lose track. In the
second step, it launches the spoofing GPS signal when the GPS
receiver carries out the acquisition processing. Consequently,
the GPS receiver will track the counterfeit GPS signal due to
its higher correlation peak, since the counterfeit GPS signal
has a higher SNR.
Alternatively, the attacker can scan the two-dimensional
space of code phase and carrier frequency until the fake
correlation peak overlaps the true correlation peak, which
is illustrated in Figure 5. The first stage is correlation peak
Fig. 6: Model for long transmission line model with fault
scanning, in which attacker launches the fake correlation peak
close to the true correlation peak and moves slowly towards
the true correlation peak. Note that it is not difficult for
the malicious attacker to estimate the location of the target
GPS receiver, such that it can obtain the information of the
true correlation peak by inducing from its own GPS receiver.
Therefore, the attacker does not need to implement blind
search on the entire two-dimensional space of code phase
and carrier frequency. In the second stage, the fake correlation
peak moves to the position in which the fake correlation peak
overlaps the true one. The GPS receiver will be captured by
the counterfeit signal and locked to the fake correlation peak,
since it has a higher SNR. In the third stage, the attacker will
move the fake correlation peak slowly to the desired point.
At this time, the true correlation peak will be considered as
noise.
III. TSA IN TRANSMISSION LINE FAULT DETECTION AND
FAULT LOCALIZATION
In this section, we study the impact of TSA on transmission
line fault detection and localization. Since a fault of a single
transmission line may trigger cascading failures spreading
within the entire power grid system, it requires quick and
accurate locationing of the fault in a wide power grid area.
One conventional method is to detect and localize the fault
by utilizing local voltage and current measurements. For im-
proving the accuracy and locationing speed, many researchers
proposed to utilize measurements at both ends of transmission
line [20] [11] [18]. These measurements are attached with
sampling time which is obtained from its GPS signal receiver;
therefore TSA can affect the fault detection and localization of
transmission lines. In this section, we will first briefly review
the fault detection and location in transmission line. Then, the
impact of TSA on the transmission line fault detection and
location will be analyzed. Simulations results will be provided
at the end of this section.
A. Fault Detection and Fault Localization for Long Transmis-
sion Line
The model of long transmission line with fault [1] [11] is
shown in Figure 6. Suppose that the total length of transmis-
sion line is L, and F is the fault location. As is shown in
Figure 6, the fault point F divides the whole transmission
line into two sections, which include line section SF and line
section FR. The transmission line sections SF and FR can
still be considered as two perfect transmission lines. We define
the fault location index D ∈ [0, 1] such that the distance from
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(a) First stage: correlation peak scanning (b) Second stage: fake correlation peak overlaps
the fake one
(c) Third stage: move the fake correlation peak
to the attacker’s desired point
Fig. 5: Spoof the GPS receiver by a three-stage attack.
the fault location F to the receiving end R is DL. On both
sides of the fault point, the transmission line is represented by
an equivalent π circuit [8]. On the transmission line section
SF , the sending end voltage of the equivalent π circuit VS is
given by
VS =
(
Z ′SFY
′
SF
2
+ 1
)
VF + Z
′
SF IS , (3)
where VF and IF are the voltage and the current at the fault
location, respectively; ZSF and YSF are the equivalent series
arm impedances and the equivalent shunt arms admittances of
transmission line section SF , respectively. Similarly, in the
transmission line section FR, the sending end voltage of the
equivalent π circuit VF is given by
VF =
(
Z ′FRY
′
FR
2
+ 1
)
VR + Z
′
FRIR, (4)
where VR and IR are the voltage and the current at the
receiving end of the transmission line, respectively; ZFR
and YFR are the equivalent series arm impedances and the
equivalent shunt arms admittances of transmission line section
FR, respectively. The equivalent series arm impedances ZSF
and ZFR are given by
Z ′SF = ZSF
sinh(γ(1−D)L)
γ(1−D)L (5)
Z ′FR = ZFR
sinh(γDL)
γDL
(6)
with
ZSF = (1−D)Lz¯ (7)
ZFR = DLz¯ (8)
γ =
√
z¯y¯ (9)
where ZSF and ZFR are the total series impedance of the
line sections SF and FR, respectively; z¯ and y¯ are the unit
line impedance and admittance, respectively; and γ is called
the attenuation constant. The equivalent shunt arms admittance
YSF and YFR are given by
Y ′SF = YSF
tanh(γ(1−D)L2 )
γ(1−D)L
2
(10)
Y ′FR = YFR
tanh(γDL2 )
γDL
2
(11)
with
YSF = (1−D)Ly¯ (12)
YFR = DLy¯ (13)
where YSF and YFR are the shunt arms admittance of the line
section SF and FR, respectively.
When fault occurs, the voltages VF at the fault location cal-
culated from (3) and (4) are identical [11]. Thus, substituting
(4) into (3), the fault location index D can be estimated as
De =
ln(N/M)
2γL
(14)
where
M =
VS + ZcIS
2
exp(−γL)− VR + ZcIR
2
(15)
N =
VR − ZcIR
2
− VS − ZcIS
2
exp(γL) (16)
where Zc =
√
z1/y1 is the characteristic impedance of
transmission line. Furthermore, it can be observed from (15)
and (16) that, if there is no fault, the computed absolute values
of M and N are all held at zero. Therefore, M and N can
also be utilized as fault indicators [11].
In practice, PMUs are installed at both ends of the transmis-
sion line to obtain VS , VR, IS , and IR. These measurements
will be conveyed to the control center along with their time
stamps. Control center will exploit the time stamps of these
measurements for alignment such that the indicators N and
M can be calculated in terms of the measurements sampled
from at the same time. In the next subsection, we will analyze
how TSA affects the transmission line fault detection and fault
location.
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B. Analysis of Impact
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of TSA on the
transmission line fault detection and location. The transmission
line fault detection and location is based on the PMUs installed
on both ends of the transmission line. It should be noted that
the measurements VS , VR, IS , and IR have complex values.
When TSA is launched toward target PMUs, the time stamps
on these measurements will be modified, which is equivalent
to modifying the phase angle of these measurements. The
phase angle errors resulted from TSA at the sending PMU and
receiving PMU are denoted by ∆θS and ∆θR, respectively.
And the measurements VS , VR, IS , and IR affected by TSA
are denoted as V˜S , V˜R, I˜S , and I˜R, which are given by
V˜S = |VS | exp j(θVS +∆θS)
= VS exp(j∆θS) (17)
V˜R = |VR| exp j(θVR +∆θR)
= VR exp(j∆θR) (18)
I˜S = |IS | exp j(θIS +∆θS)
= IS exp(j∆θS) (19)
I˜R = |IR| exp j(θIR +∆θR)
= IR exp(j∆θR) (20)
To analyze the impact of TSA on the transmission line fault
detection, we substitute (17)-(20) into (15) and (16) and then
obtain
M˜ =
VS + ZcIS
2
exp(−γL) exp(j∆θS)
−VR + ZcIR
2
exp(j∆θR) (21)
N˜ =
VR − ZcIR
2
exp(j∆θR)
−VS − ZcIS
2
exp(γL) exp(j∆θS). (22)
The impacts of TSA on the line fault detection indicators M
and N are equivalent to adding amplitude modulations. The
error of line fault location due to TSA is given by
∆D = D −DTSA
= (
1
2γL
) ln(
N
M
M˜
N˜
)
= (
1
2γL
) ln(
(A+B)(C +Dǫ)
(C +D)(A +Bǫ)
) (23)
with
A = VR − ZcIR (24)
B = −(VS − ZcIS) exp(γL) (25)
C = −(VR + ZcIR) (26)
D = (VS + ZcIS) exp(−γL) (27)
ǫ = exp(j(∆θR −∆θS)) = exp(j∆θ), (28)
where ∆θ denotes the asynchronisim of the phase angles of
the measurements between the sending end and the receiving
end caused by TSA. In the next subsection, the simulation
results will show that the attacker can obtain the maximum
TABLE I: Simulation settings for transmission line fault
detection and location
Parameters Setting values
Sending End
Voltage VS 25000(V)
Receiving End
Voltage VR 20000(V)
Frequency 60(Hz)
Transmission
line length 400(km)
Transmission
line resistance 0.249168 + j0.60241(Ohms/km)
Transmission
line inductance 0.00156277 + j0.60241(H/km)
Transmission
line capacitance 19.469 × 10−9 + j12.06678 × 10−9(F/km)
Fig. 7: Simulation model for transmission line fault detection
and location
line fault location error by launching TSA jointly on both the
sending and receiving ends simultaneously.
C. Simulation results of TSA on transmission line fault detec-
tion and location
In this section, simulations have been conducted to evaluate
the impacts of TSA on the transmission line fault detection and
fault location. The simulation model for transmission line is
shown in Figure 7. The parameters used for the transmission
line are listed in Table I, which are the same as those in [20].
Firstly, we study the impact on the fault indicator. Figure
8 shows the TSA impacts on the fault indicators M and N
when various ∆θS and ∆θR are applied for TSA. From (15)
and (16), M and N should both hold on zeros, when there is
no transmission line fault. However, when malicious attackers
launch TSA cooperatively on both the sending and receiving
ends of the transmission line, the attackers can modify the fault
indicator value. Consequently, TSA may trigger false alarm at
the control center.
We simulate the scenario when there is a three-phase
grounded transmission line fault. Figure 9 demonstrates the
TSA impact on the transmission line fault location. We
simulate various scenarios in which the line fault occurs in
different locations. From Figure 9, we observe that TSA
can produce fault location error as large as 180km. Notice
that it is important to locate the fault accurately in a short
time; otherwise, the local line fault may lead to network-
wide cascading fault. Therefor the error caused by TSA will
severely affect the system-wide reliability of smart grid.
Figure 10 demonstrates the TSA impacts on various types of
transmission line faults. It is observed from Figure 10 that TSA
has different impact patterns for different types of transmission
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Fig. 8: Impacts of TSA on transmission line fault indicator
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
200
∆θ
Fa
ul
t l
oc
at
io
n 
er
ro
r c
au
se
d 
by
 T
SA
 (k
m)
 
 
D = 0.4
D = 0.5
D = 0.7
Fig. 9: Impacts of TSA on transmission line fault location
line faults. However, the malicious attacker can always launch
a TSA causing the maximal error to the transmission line fault
location by cooperatively attacking the sending and receiving
ends.
IV. TSA IN VOLTAGE STABILITY MONITORING
Voltage stability monitoring is one of the key tasks in smart
grid. One commonly used method to evaluate the voltage
stability is to apply T-equivalent and Thevenin equivalent
circuit to set up a simplified model for power system [14].
The key idea is to apply GPS based synchronized PMU to
monitor the voltage and current in order to obtain the voltage
stability indicators. In this section, we study the impact of
TSA on the voltage stability monitoring.
A. Model of Voltage Stability Monitoring
The simplified power system modeling for voltage stability
monitoring includes two key stages. The first stage is to calcu-
late the parameters of a T-equivalent of the actual transmission
corridor with the GPS based synchronized measurements [14].
Figure 11 illustrates the T-equivalent circuit.
In the T-equivalent circuit, the whole network is divided
into three parts: generation source E¯g with impedance Z¯g,
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a single phase to ground fault
phase−to−phase interconnected fault
Fig. 10: Impacts of TSA on various types of transmission line
faults
Fig. 11: T-equivalent circuit for power system
transmission network and local load. The available mea-
surements include local measurements VR, IR, and remote
measurements VS , IS which are associated with the generation
source and the transmission network. These measurements can
be sampled by PMU and be conveyed to the control center
along with their time stamps. The control center aligns these
measurements according to their time stamps and obtains the
system operation parameters Z¯T , Z¯sh and Z¯L, which can be
estimated as follows:
Z¯T = 2
VS − VR
IS + IR
(29)
Z¯sh = −VSIR + VRIS
I2R − I2S
(30)
Z¯L =
VR
IR
. (31)
The complex valued generator voltage E¯g and its equivalent
impedance Z¯g cannot be estimated simultaneously. However,
in practical cases, Z¯g is assumed to be known by the charac-
teristics of the step-up transformers and the transmission line.
Thus, the equivalent complex voltage of the generators is given
by
E¯g = VS + ISZ¯g. (32)
After calculating the parameters of the T-equivalent circuit,
the Thevenin equivalent circuit is applied to further simplify
the power system model. E¯th and Z¯th are associated with the
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following equation:
E¯th = VR + Z¯thIR, (33)
where E¯th and Z¯th are the equivalent voltage source and
the equivalent source impedance in the Thevenin equivalent
circuit, which can be calculated by the parameters of the T-
equivalent circuit:
E¯th = VR
Z¯th + Z¯L
Z¯L
(34)
Z¯th =
Z¯T
2
+
1
1
Zsh
+ 1
ZT /2+Z¯g
. (35)
When there are transmission lines tripped, the system volt-
age will become unstable. If the malfunction is not repaired
in time, the entire system will eventually collapse. With the
Thevenin equivalent circuit, two important stability margins
can be obtained [14]. The first indicator is associated with
load impedance, which is given by
MARGINZ = 100(1− kcrit), (36)
where
kcrit =
∣∣∣∣ Z¯thZ¯L
∣∣∣∣ . (37)
Assuming that the type of load is constant power consumer,
we define a scale factor k which is used to model the change
in the load impedance. We can set Z¯L = kZ¯L0, where Z¯L0
represents the value of load impedance. The transfer power is
given by
PL = ℜ
(
kZ¯L0
∣∣∣∣ E¯thZ¯th + Z¯L0
∣∣∣∣
2
)
. (38)
Substituting k = kcrit into (38), we can obtain the maximum
possible power transfer, which is given by
PLmax = ℜ
(
kcritZ¯L0
∣∣∣∣ E¯thZ¯th + kcritZ¯L0
∣∣∣∣
2
)
(39)
The second indicator is associated with the active power
delivered to the load bus, which is given by
MARGINP =
{
pLmax − PL, if Z¯L > Z¯th
0, if Z¯L > Z¯th
. (40)
B. Analysis of Impact
TSA affects the time stamps of the monitoring measure-
ments similarly to the analysis in (17)-(20). It will modify the
local and remote monitoring measurements by modifying their
phase angles. It can be observed that all the voltage stability
monitoring indicators are based on the T-equivalent parameters
Z¯T , Z¯sh, and Z¯L. Under TSA, these three parameters are
modified to
Z¯ ′T = 2
VS exp(j∆θS)− VR exp(j∆θR)
IS exp(j∆θS) + IR exp(j∆θR)
(41)
Z¯ ′sh = −
(VSIR + VRIS)
I2R exp(j2∆θR)− I2S exp(j2∆θS)
×(exp j(∆θS +∆θR)) (42)
Z¯ ′L =
VR exp(j∆θR)
IR exp(j∆θR)
= Z¯L. (43)
Fig. 12: Simulation model for voltage stability
It can be observed that the TSA affects both Z¯T and Z¯sh.
Furthermore, it concerns the Thevenin equivalent circuit pa-
rameters Z¯th and E¯th. Since Z¯th depends on the calcula-
tion result of the T-equivalent parameters Z¯T and Z¯sh, the
Thevenin equivalent impedance will be substantially affected
by TSA. Consequently, TSA affects the entire calculation of
the indicators of voltage stability monitoring. In the next sub-
section, simulation results will demonstrate the TSA impacts.
C. Simulations of Voltage Stability Monitoring under TSA
The simulation model for voltage stability monitoring is
shown in Fig. 12. The root mean square amplitude of source
voltage dynamically changes with frequency 1Hz. The load
has constant power comsuption. There are three transmission
lines. A type phase ABC short-circuit fault occurs on transmis-
sion line 1 between 2 seconds and 2.5 seconds. Transmission
lines 1 and 2 are tripped at time 4 seconds and 6 seconds.
It should be noted that the voltage stability indicators
are calculated based on ZT and Zsh. Figure 13 shows the
impacts of TSA on the calculation of the T-equivalent circuit
parameters ZT and Zsh. Without TSA, there are two sharp
steps in ZT , which are due to the line trippings. However,
TSA makes these obvious line tripping symptoms ambiguous.
The impact of TSA on the T-equivalent circuit parameters can
be considered as having amplitude modulations upon ZT and
Zsh.
The further impact of TSA on the Thevenin equivalent
circuit parameters calculation is shown in Figure 14. It can
be observed from Figure 14 that TSA has a significant impact
on the Thevenin equivalent impedance Zth and the phase of
the Thevenin equivalent voltage source Eth. The impacts of
TSA are similar to those in the T-equivalent circuit, which
have amplitude modulations on the parameters.
The impacts of TSA on voltage stability indicators are
demonstrated in Fig. 15 with different attack strategies. It can
be observed that the margin of active delivered power has been
greatly reduced due to the TSA, which misleads the system
to implement wrong actions of voltage stabilization.
V. TSA IN REGIONAL DISTURBING EVENT LOCATION
In this section, we identify the impact of TSA on regional
disturbing event location in smart grid. One of the important
tasks in smart grid is to locate the disturbing event in smart
grid in a short time, and consequent isolation will be im-
plemented to prevent cascading failure from spreading to the
entire power network. The disturbing event location is based
on the time of arrival (TOA) algorithm [24], which requires
accurate event arrival time. Therefore, TSA has a significant
impact on the regional disturbing event location.
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Fig. 14: Impacts of TSA on the parameters calculation in Thevenin equivalent circuit with different attack strategy
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Fig. 13: Impacts of TSA on the parameters calculation in T-
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Fig. 15: TSA impacts on the voltage stability indicators
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A. Principle of Regional Disturbing Event Location
When a significant disturbance occurs, there will be many
symptoms such as voltage and frequency oscillations in both
time and space. The perturbation will travel throughout the
grid [21]. Therefore, the distributed monitoring devices can
capture the variance of the measurements and send these
data to the monitoring system server or exchange with its
neighbors. The event time and location can be deduced from
the time stamps with these measurements. After receiving
the measurements from these monitoring devices, the servers
need to decide the hypocenter of the event, which is typi-
cally marked as the wave front arrival time [3]. By aligning
these measurements according to their time stamps, the event
arriving time on each monitoring device can be attained.
Consequently, the disturbing event location can be deduced
by triangulation, which is illustrated in Figure 16 when there
are four PMUs for the event locationing. The disturbing event
Fig. 16: Illustration of regional disturbing event location
location can be derived from solving the following equations
when four PMUs are involved

(x1 − xe)2 + (y1 − ye)2 − V 2e (t1 − te)2 = 0
(x2 − xe)2 + (y2 − ye)2 − V 2e (t2 − te)2 = 0
(x3 − xe)2 + (y3 − ye)2 − V 2e (t3 − te)2 = 0
(x4 − xe)2 + (y4 − ye)2 − V 2e (t4 − te)2 = 0,
,
when ti, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is the disturbing event arrival time to
the i-th PMU, (xi, yi) and (xe, ye) are the coordinates of the
i-th PMU and the disturbing event location, respectively; Ve is
the event propagation speed in the power grid network. Since
the coordinates and the arrival time of each PMU are known,
Newtion’s method can be applied to solve these equations to
attain the event location and time. Since the sampling is trigged
by the GPS receiving signal, a forged GPS time signal can
control the sampling in a wrong time and provide wrong time
stamps for the measurements.
B. Analysis of Impact
The principle to obtain the event location coordination
and the event time is the TOA algorithm. Since the event
monitoring devices in power network are allocated far away
from each other, it is difficult to launch cooperative TSA. In
this paper, we analyze the scenario of a single TSA attacker
to the system. We assume that PMU-1 is suffering form TSA,
and the arrival time of PMU-1 is modified as
t1 = t
0
1 +∆t, (44)
where t01 is the true arrival time of PMU-1, and ∆t is the time
error due to the TSA. We set (x1, y1) as the origin of the trans-
form coordinate for simplicity of analysis [24]. We also set
(x2, y2) and (x3, y3) as (a, 0) and (b, c) in the transform co-
ordinates, respectively, where a =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2,
and b and c can be easily changed into the new coordinates
by using the follow equations:
b = (x3 − x1) cosα+ (y3 − y1) sinα (45)
c = −(x3 − x1) sinα+ (y3 − y1) cosα, (46)
where
α = tan−1
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
. (47)
We define k2 = x′2e + y
′2
e , where (x′e, y′e) is the transformed
coordinate for the event location. Similarly to the analysis in
[24], we define two pseudo-ranges L = (t2 − t1)Ve and R =
(t3− t1)Ve. It is easy to obtain the close form of the solution,
which is given by
x′e = A+Bk (48)
y′e = C +Dk, (49)
where
A =
a2 − L2
2a
(50)
B = −L
a
(51)
C =
b2 + c2 − 2bA−R2
2c
(52)
D = −R+ bB
c
. (53)
It is easy to transform the coordinate of the event location into
the original coordinate, which is given by
xe = x
′
e cosα− y′e sinα+ x1 (54)
ye = x
′
e sinα− y′e cosα+ y1. (55)
Since TSA only affects PMU-1, we analyze how t1 affects the
location error. The partial derivatives x′e and y′e with respect
to t1 are given by (56) and (57).
The parameter N , M , and P can further expressed as:
N = AB + CD (58)
M = B2 +D2 − 1 (59)
P = A2 + C2. (60)
After obtaining the partial differentiation in the transform
coordinate, it is easy to obtain the partial differentiations in
the original coordinate, which are given by
∂xe
∂t1
= δx(t1) cosα− δy(t1) sinα (61)
∂ye
∂t1
= δx(t1) sinα+ δy(t1) cosα (62)
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δx(t1) =
∂xe
∂t1
=
L
a
Ve +
K
a
Ve
+BM
−(AVe/a−BLVe/a+ C/c(Ve − bVe/a) +DVe(−bL/ac+R/c))
(B2 +D2 − 1)2
∓BM 4NVe(A/a+ LB/a+ C/c(1− b/a) +D(−bL/(ac) +R/c))
4(B2 +D2 − 1)2√N2 − 4MP
±8BMVe(AL/a+ C(−bL/ac+R/c)) + PVe(B/a+D/c(1− b/a))
4(B2 +D2 − 1)2√N2 − 4MP
+BVe(B/a+D/c(1− b/a))(N ±
√
N2 − 4MP ), (56)
δy(t1) =
∂ye
∂t1
=
Ve
c
(R − bL/a+ (1− b/a)k)
+DM
−(AVe/a−BLVe/a+ C/c(Ve − bVe/a) +DVe(−bL/ac+R/c))
(B2 +D2 − 1)2
∓DM 4NVe(A/a+ LB/a+ C/c(1− b/a) +D(−bL/(ac) +R/c))
4(B2 +D2 − 1)2√N2 − 4MP
±8DMVe(AL/a+ C(−bL/ac+R/c)) + PVe(B/a+D/c(1− b/a))
4(B2 +D2 − 1)2√N2 − 4MP
+DVe(B/a+D/c(1− b/a))(N ±
√
N2 − 4MP ), (57)
C. Simulation Results
For the disturbing event location, the sampling is trigged
by the GPS time signal as illustrated in Figure 1. A forged
GPS time signal can control the sampling in a wrong time
or provide a wrong time stamp for the measurements. The
simulation illustrating the impact on the event location is
shown in Figure 17. It is observed that, with one PMU under
TSA, the estimation of disturbing event will be far away from
the true position (the event happening in Mississippi is misled
to Tennessee).
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Fig. 17: Simulation of TSA on disturbing event location
Based on the analytical results, we simulate the location
error with different ∆t, which is given by Figure 18. It is
observed that the location error caused by TSA is nonlinear.
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Fig. 18: Location error under various ∆t
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the GPS spoofing based
TSA in power grids. The time stamps are modified by the
forged GPS signal, and the measurements with time stamps
will be corrupted by TSA. For several scenarios, the impacts
of TSA have been studied. For the transmission line fault
detection and location, TSA can not only deteriorate the
performance of fault location, but also increase the false alarm
probability with some fault indicators. For the voltage stability
monitoring, TSA can exaggerate the power margin and result
in delaying or disabling the voltage instability alarm. It has
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also been demonstrated that the TSA can significantly damage
the event location in power grid.
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